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Abstract. The number of Internet users is growing exponentially in China and Chinese netizens
are slowly developing social groupings online that influence events and situations in the “real”
world. The Chinese government is predictably wary of these developments as an emerging
community of netizens is increasingly becoming aware of its great potential influence. Over the
past two years (2006 and 2007) an uneasy unofficial truce has emerged so that netizens are rela-
tively free to criticize and discuss local issues or events, while the central government sup-
presses everything it regards as excessive criticism or as an attack against the ruling party. Chi-
nese netizens seem to have accepted these conditions to a large extent, and often explicitly sup-
port the central government while attacking local officials, businesses, institutions, etc. or even
other netizens perceived to have broken the unwritten rules of Chinese Cyberspace.
1. INTRODUCTION
Discussing China’s current Internet policies and the online society that has grown around them
is a daunting task. The situation is still highly fluid and politically and philosophically contro-
versial. While websites like YouTube or Facebook have established their presence in most peo-
ple’s minds as symbols of the Internet, both were only made available to the general public in
2005 – less than three years ago. The Internet and many of the sites frequented both inside and
outside China, and which are often portrayed as the driving forces behind new societal devel-
opments, are still in their infancy. Governments everywhere, not only in China, are struggling to
strike a balance between civil liberties and control of a new medium of communication.
Alongside these official struggles to interpret the state’s role in and relationship with the
Internet, an ideological fight is ongoing over the character the Internet should have, echoing the
political debates of the past 500 years. Should the Internet be free? What does “freedom” mean?
Are there limits to freedom? Do individuals have rights (and/or duties) on the Internet? Who
safeguards those rights? How are those rights defined? Who has the power to define and police
these rights? Are there international standards that Internet users should follow and can claim as
their rights?
The list of debates is endless, and the spectrum of ideologies applied to provide answers
covers the whole range from Thomas Hobbes’ controlling monster state to Mikhail Bakunin’s
vision of collectivist anarchy. There are those who see the Internet as the last truly free place on
Earth. Some see it as a lawless place, where the technologically advanced prey on the weak.
Some present it as a new world that will bring democracy and freedom to all, while others argue
that it is merely a new form of communication technology that is subject to the laws and regula-
tions of the time and space its users occupy.
This article will not delve into these fundamental debates. Instead, it aims to provide a neu-
tral description of some of the developments in the relationship between state and cyber-society
in China. It is meant to provide background and a starting point for debates on the future devel-
opment of China and of the role of Internet users and the emerging online civil society within
these processes of development. The paper as such does not advocate any specific political
agenda, be it pro-China or anti-China, nor formulate judgments or recommendations for the fu-
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ture. Rather, its purpose is to provoke an open, academic debate on current events in China and
on how to analyze (and understand) them.
2. THE INTERNET IN CHINA
China’s Internet has been the focus of much attention over the past few years. Academics, jour-
nalists, activists, and bloggers have all repeatedly examined the Chinese Internet and pointed to
some of the differences between Chinese Internet space and the networks accessed by the rest of
the world. While comparisons of Chinese Internet space with others are useful, this article fo-
cuses on the relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese Internet users, or netizens.
Comparisons will only be employed to allow for a better appreciation of the situation in China.
The Internet in China emerged in tandem with the Internet in Europe and America, but its
structures and set up soon diverged (For more details on the history of China’s Internet see
CINIC, n.d.). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, academic institutions in China started to
network computers and universities with the help of funding and knowledge transfers from
European and North American research institutions. These networks grew and in 1994 China
was connected to the Internet through a dedicated line between China and the Sprint Corpora-
tion in the USA. Over the next two years, additional connections to the Internet were created
and the structure of and control over the Chinese Internet was decided.
Four organizations were created to provide Internet access in China: the China Education
and Research Network (CERNET), the China Science and Technology Network (CSTNet),
ChinaNET, and the China Golden Bridge Network (ChinaGBN). The latter two provided com-
mercial Internet access, while the former two were set up for educational and research institu-
tions. In early 1997, the public was allowed onto the Internet for the first time, albeit only via
the already established networks. This established a pattern for the development of the Internet
in China since then, in that China’s netizens have only been able to access and use spaces that
the government or government-controlled institutions have established and still exercise control
over.
The state or state-controlled entities have owned the physical backbone of the Internet in
China instead of privately-held companies, as is customary in Europe and North America. As a
result, the central government has always been in a much stronger position to control Chinese
cyberspace. In China, the government does not have to attempt to gain greater control over the
Internet; instead, it is the government that allows everything that goes on in Chinese cyberspace
to happen, which is a very different situation altogether from Western discourses on the Internet
as the last free, unrestricted, and non-controlled space for communication.
In China, the freedom people have on the Internet is a freedom ultimately granted to them
by the central government or its agencies, although often more from a laissez-faire attitude than
from a decision to grant Chinese netizens more freedom. The Chinese government seems to see
the Internet on the whole more like a children’s playground where Chinese adults can engage in
games, an attitude born out in 2003 by an announcement of the State General Administration of
Sport that formally approved E-sports, i.e. online gaming, as a national athletic sports discipline.
China, together with Korea, has for the past few years started to engage in international E-sports
events and competitions, including a few world championships and not a few students at univer-
sities today dream of becoming professional online gamers and E-sports athletes.
3. STATE CONTROL OVER THE CHINESE INTERNET
The Chinese Central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been compara-
tively successful in establishing – or more correctly, keeping – control over the Internet and in
limiting the access its citizens have to contents deemed inappropriate or dangerous. It has to be
noted, though, that the official Chinese criteria for evaluation of what is inappropriate and what
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is permissible differs substantively from European or North-American definitions. Governments
across Europe and North America have largely focused on the application of national or interna-
tional laws to the conceptualized international setting of the Internet. As a result, cross-national
issues (e.g. copyright, privacy, etc.) or legal variations between countries (e.g. gambling restric-
tions, bans on Nazi memorabilia, etc.) have dominated Internet discourses.
In China, such considerations have only played a minor role within official discourses on the
Internet. One example is computer piracy, which in stark contrast to the Euro-American Internet,
is practiced widely and openly on sites that offer the free and direct download of scanned-in
books, software, movies, etc. without being hindered by authorities. Although piracy is offi-
cially illegal, copyright regulations remain under-enforced, while the government’s attention
centers more on content that is judged to be harmful to Chinese society, e.g. pornography, relig-
ion, political activism, ethnic separatism, etc.
Additionally, in China the emphasis is not on laws and regulations, but instead on self-
regulation and self-discipline. Again in contrast to Europe and North America, there is a notice-
able lack of calls for increased regulation of the Internet by the government. One striking exam-
ple of this difference is the call by teachers in England for the government to enforce privacy
laws on the Internet after students had posted a video of parts of a lesson on YouTube. In a simi-
lar case in China that will be discussed in more detail below, the Chinese government asked all
involved to exercise more restraint, and there were no calls for government action.
Since 1997, when China’s cyberspace was opened up to ordinary citizens, state-run and
state-controlled institutions have repeatedly called on Internet users to exercise self-discipline
and to restrain themselves. These admonishments have resulted in the formulation of documents,
published in 2002, 2004, and 2005, that detail the level of self-discipline expected of Chinese
netizens. Despite the level of control the central government has or could employ in Chinese
cyberspace, it appears as if it is more a matter of slowly allowing more freedom on the Internet
instead of fighting to gain control over the web. When pushed to do so, the central government
has shown that it possesses the ability to shut down those parts of the Chinese Internet that dis-
please China’s leaders very quickly, be it online blogs, forums, or more recently pornography
websites running on servers inside China. Extreme levels of control are however only rarely
employed by Chinese authorities and usually only in cases where an intervention is part of a
larger political campaign or crackdown on specific issues.
The normal control exercised by the Chinese government over the Internet experience of
Chinese users consists of four highly effective strategies. These are the “Great Fire-Wall of
China” (GFW), ISP-enforced blacklisting of specific words, or phrases, the coercion of multina-
tional technology corporations, and real-world access-controls. These strategies, while not uni-
formly successful and often unevenly employed, have had a major influence on the Chinese
Internet, as Internet users have not only been affected directly, but have also adapted their own
behavior so as to exist within the framework provided by the state.
The “Great Fire-Wall of China” presents itself to the user not as an inflexible and clearly de-
fined barrier, but instead as a multi-faceted and ever-changing system of highly localized rules.
Access to websites outside China can vary widely between different cities and changes from
time to time. One constant in the GFW is the relatively slow access and loading speed of web-
sites outside China when compared to websites inside China. There are only a limited number of
physical connections between the Chinese Internet and the outside world, which creates a tech-
nological bottleneck that makes frequent visits to websites outside China unattractive. When
measuring the speed of an individual Internet connection via several of the many speed meters
available online, intra-China links are 5-10 times as fast as links to international websites. While
not impossible to surmount, this slowdown of the Internet on sites outside China has resulted in
a marked lack of interest of casual Chinese Internet users in sites perceived to be plagued with a
lack of speed and frequent time-outs.
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The limited number of access points to the Chinese Internet also makes the blocking of spe-
cific websites or domains easier to enforce, by for example using node-side scripts to block all
web pages on the servers of http://news.bbc.co.uk/, while allowing users to continue browsing
http://www.bbc.co.uk/. Such node-side scripting enables Chinese government departments to
institute temporary restrictions, to allow local variations, and to enforce specifically targeted
bans on sites that displease them. During the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress,
for example, CNN, Reuters, BBC, and other news sites often become difficult or impossible to
access without resorting to the use of Internet proxies.
A number of research teams at universities in the UK and the USA have recently started to
investigate the exact nature of the node-side scripting to determine how the GFW operates, but
nothing has been published yet. It is clear, though, that different physical entry-points to the
Chinese Internet are using different scripts and that the GFW is neither uniform nor unchanging.
Netizens in Shanghai might have access to the CNN website while those in Beijing are blocked,
but the Beijing version of the GFW instead allows netizens to access the blogspot blogging ser-
vice that is inaccessible from Shanghai, etc. A month later, the reverse might be true, or an en-
tirely different set of rules could be in place. This even affects online email services (e.g., Gmail,
Yahoo, and Hotmail) and expatriates living in China often find they have to switch between the
three from time to time, as they become blocked or unblocked.
ISP-enforced blacklisting of specific words is another form of control government depart-
ments at all levels can exercise in China. If a Chinese netizen, for instance, tries to access sites
with the terms “Falun Gong” or “Tian An Men Massacre” on them, the connection between the
Internet user’s computer and the server with the offensive content is interrupted which leads to a
message back that the web page or site cannot be found or does not exist. In some cases, the
user is then redirected to a different web site hosted inside China, which serves as a warning to
the user that the access problem is of political and not of technological nature. Advanced users
can circumvent these blocks via Internet proxies, such as the popular Tor service that has even
been integrated into the Firefox web browser, but again most of China’s casual Internet users
are deterred from accessing information Chinese government officials deem inappropriate.
The combination of being able to target specific servers and to black-list specific terms or
phrases has had the additional benefit for the Chinese government of allowing them to put pres-
sure on multi-national technology corporations and to co-opt them into improving official con-
trol over the Internet. Multi-national technology corporations (e.g., Yahoo, Google, Cisco, etc.)
have found it easier and more economically viable to work with Chinese authorities instead of
trying to ignore their demands while still doing business in and with China. While these compa-
nies have come under much criticism in the USA and in Europe for their concessions to the
Chinese government, the physical structure of the Chinese Internet and the extent of official
control over it makes doing business while ignoring official wishes almost impossible. As a re-
sult, Yahoo forwards emails with offensive or – in China – illegal content to the Chinese au-
thorities, while both Yahoo and Google default users to special Chinese versions of their search
engines that have politically offensive content excluded from search results. Cisco also advises
government departments, including the police and Chinese security agencies, on how to im-
prove their control over the data streams processed through Cisco’s backbone servers in China.
The cooperation between multinationals and Chinese authorities is extensive, and while
European and North American activists have criticized these mostly American companies, both
the legal situation and the set up of the Internet in China make full cooperation economically
imperative. In this context it should also be noted briefly that such criticisms seem to focus
more on the political ideology of the Chinese government than the increasing control of gov-
ernments and government agencies over the Internet. The National Security Agency (NSA) in
the USA has been reading emails for years, and in the United Kingdom employers are legally
liable for the content of emails sent from company servers, thus forcing them to either ban all
emails from their offices, or to check them for inappropriate content. A French court forced Ya-
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hoo to remove items from its auction website that the French legal system found objectionable,
and Yahoo cooperated with this censorship of content available to French Internet users. Com-
pared to the level of cooperation European and North American governments and their depart-
ments have enjoyed from these same corporations, it is remarkable that they should come under
criticism for providing similar services to the Chinese government and its agencies.
The least effective method of control uses “real world” access-controls that focus on indi-
vidual and enterprise users of computers, instead of addressing the content of websites. In the-
ory, if not always in practice, all Internet users in China have to register before being able to
access the Internet. Before Internet lines are installed in a home, the home owner and the main
occupant, e g. someone renting an apartment, have to register for the service with their ID cards
or passports. Internet cafes are legally required to register for business permits, and to record
personal details for all users who use their services which are then checked by the local police.
The effectiveness of these measures is hampered, though, through their lackluster application
and enforcement at a local level, which only changes during high profile government campaigns
that push for a strict adherence to the rules and regulations of Internet access.
Similar to the application of other rules, regulations, and laws in the People’s Republic of
China, registration requirements for Internet users are usually not strictly enforced. This situa-
tion only changes when events force the central government or local government departments to
organize a campaign against specific problem issues. One such issue was the deadly arson at-
tack on an Internet cafe in Beijing in 2002 by two young teenagers. Many of the customers us-
ing the Internet cafe at the time were unable to escape the flames as the fire doors were inacces-
sible and the windows had been barred. This resulted in the closing down of most of the Internet
cafes in Beijing until each had passed a fire safety inspection, as well as the temporary enforce-
ment of regulations prohibiting under-age teenagers from entering Internet cafes, with an in-
creased attendant emphasis on registration requirements for all Internet users.
The overall picture that emerges from an overview over the strategies employed by the Chi-
nese government to control both access to and the content of the Internet in China confirms that
the Chinese government has generally adopted a laissez-faire attitude and policy towards Chi-
nese cyberspace, expecting local netizens to exercise self-restraint and self-discipline. It is also
clear that this is a choice made by the authorities and does not stem from a lack of technological
capabilities. In the following section, the article discusses some of the ways Chinese netizens
have used the freedom given to them by authorities, not only to regulate their own behavior, but
also increasingly to influence events in the real world, thereby forcing local and central authori-
ties to react.
4. CHINESE VIGILANTES
During 2006 and 2007 a number of incidents occurred in China’s cyberspace that demonstrated
the growing levels of organization and connectivity of Chinese Internet users. If taken on their
own, each of these cases merely illustrates how Chinese netizens express their displeasure with
specific localized events. Seen together and as examples for numerous similar occurrences dur-
ing the past few years, they allow for much broader conclusions. They demonstrate several
trends in the behavior of Chinese netizens that indicate the development and the official accep-
tance of a civil society in China’s cyberspace. This virtual civil society is growing in influence
and has repeatedly caused disturbances in the off-line world that have forced the Chinese gov-
ernment to act and to intervene in specific local situations. In the following paragraphs this arti-
cle will discuss several cases of Internet vigilantism to introduce the reader to the phenomenon
and to demonstrate a number of commonalities between the different cases.
One of the first incidents to gain widespread notice in the Chinese Internet sphere and the
worldwide press was an accusation of infidelity a dedicated World of Warcraft (WoW) gamer
posted on a bulletin board (BBS) against his wife in April 2006 (Fox Knight, 2006; French
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2006). A man suspected his wife of infidelity with a student she had met while playing WoW
and on checking some of his wife’s log files, messages, and emails, he found proof of an on-
going liaison between the two. Instead of confronting them directly, though, he wrote a 5,000
word post on a popular BBS, accusing his wife and the student publicly of adultery and asking
fellow netizens for their help. Netizens responded in great numbers and within days the real
name of the student behind the WoW handle that the betrayed husband had discovered was
posted online together with his address, phone number, etc. Enraged netizens started harassing
the student and his family to a degree that he and his entire family barricaded themselves into
their family home and disconnected all lines of communication to the outside world to escape
the harassment and threats. The student’s university and the parent’s employers were contacted
by netizens asking for their immediate dismissals, and extremist posters on blogs and BBS fo-
rums called for the public execution of the student and the unfaithful wife for breaking up a
marriage. The husband tried to stop the excesses by calling on netizens to cease the attacks and
by joining his wife and the student in publicly denying that an affair had taken place, but only
the passing of time and the lack of further input managed to slowly defuse the situation.
An event that captured media attention worldwide but started in Chinese cyberspace hap-
pened in 2007, consisting of the discovery of widespread slavery in brick making factories in
central China (Associated Press, 2007; Watts, 2007). Desperate parents who had lost their chil-
dren suspected that they had been kidnapped and were being forced to work as slaves in a num-
ber of small factories in Henan province. Local authorities were reluctant to help the parents in
the search for their children and in several cases refused to help even when the parents had
proof of their claims. In desperation, 400 fathers joined together and posted an open letter online,
asking netizens to help them recover their children and to pressure authorities into taking action.
Netizens responded in large numbers and through their support and action, as well as through
Western media sources that had been alerted by some of the netizens, the central government
was pressured into taking direct action and into cracking down on brick making factories in a
large-scale police action that ended up in freeing thousands of young Chinese who had been
forced into slavery by business owners and colluding local officials.
Another incident was hardly noticed by Western news media, but created quite a stir in Chi-
nese cyberspace in 2007. It concerned the public misbehavior of Chinese individuals who were
subsequently condemned by the online community and punished through at times extreme har-
assment. This was the story of Beijing Boy, a video about students of an Art school in Beijing
whose videoed antics in the classroom met with intense criticism online after being uploaded to
various video websites, among them YouTube and its Chinese counterpart Tudou. The uploaded
video shows two male students physically attacking a teacher during class while about half of
the other students are cheering them on and the teacher tries to continue his lesson. Netizens
identified both the school and all the students involved within days and began a harassment
campaign that only died down after both CCTV 1 and CCTV 2 delivered a response from the
central government asking netizens to control themselves and to calm down while the govern-
ment appointed a commission to investigate the matter. One interesting aspect of this affair was
that netizens repeatedly asked for an increase in government regulations and a tightening of
government control over schools and student behavior. A commentator on CCTV 2, however,
argued that such an increase of government control was not necessary as long as all the parties
involved exercised more self-restraint.
The government was seemingly not interested in getting involved in the affair. They never
moved to protect the art school in Haidian, nor the students or their families while they were
being targeted for harassment. Authorities were also strangely absent when a crowd of self ap-
pointed reporters descended on the school and tried to enter the school grounds during teaching
hours, and they didn’t stop the reporters from harassing all who entered or left the school cam-
pus. Netizens were lobbying for an increase in government control over education and over the
behavior of both teachers and students, but the official answer given via CCTV was to ask for
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more individual responsibility and self-restraint while arguing against the need for stricter gov-
ernment control, both on the Internet and in real life.
Finally, two cases involving foreigners have to be mentioned here – one in which a foreigner
became the target of Chinese vigilantes after blogging about his sexual conquests in Shanghai,
the other a traffic incident in which a Western woman stopped a car driver from entering a bicy-
cle lane in Beijing. The Western woman had an altercation with the driver during which the
Chinese man forcibly removed her bicycle from the road. The Western woman did not back
down, however, and retrieved her bicycle to continue to block the car’s entry into the bike lane.
The event, like many others would not have been remarkable, except for the fact that a by-
stander had pointed his mobile phone at the developing situation and uploaded the resulting
photos.
While the photos show numerous Chinese bystanders who looked on but did not interfere in
the scene to either support the Western woman or the Chinese driver, the reaction online was
very different. Chinese netizens were outraged at first that a Western woman had dared to tell a
Chinese man how to behave in his own country, but this impulsive and nationalistic reaction
changed soon to at first include and later on focus solely on criticizing the Chinese man in
online debates. Netizens accused him of having embarrassed the entire Chinese nation, of hav-
ing lost face for China, and wondered why a country with a 5,000 year history kept producing
such uncultured people. As the debates gathered steam online, netizens used the partly visible
number plates in the photographs to track down the driver, and soon the driver’s name and his
personal details, including his phone numbers, were published online, at which point the online
community started harassing him and his family, until he publicly apologized for his behavior
and for having shamed China.
The foreign woman in the pictures was never identified, nor did anyone try to track her
down or to involve her in the debates. The driver’s apology that the online community forced
him to make was also not directed at her. The driver did not apologize for having threatened the
foreign woman or for having thrown her bicycle to the side of the road, but instead he apolo-
gized to Chinese netizens for having embarrassed and shamed the Chinese nation in front of
foreigners.
The Western man, an English teacher with the online name of Chinabounder, had been de-
scribing his sexual conquests of Chinese girls in Shanghai on the Blogspot blogging service.
The blog’s language was highly literary and the author described his sexual encounters with
numerous Shanghainese women in great detail. Additionally, he also used comments made by
his female partners to criticize China, Chinese culture, Chinese politics, Chinese men, etc. on a
wide range of issues, displaying a lot of detailed knowledge of China’s history, which he used to
defend his views against all who attempted to argue against him in comments left on his blog
(Chinabounder, n.d. – The entries referred to here date to the time before September 2006).
The fact that Blogspot had been blocked in China at the time meant that he remained unno-
ticed by Chinese netizens for many months, although he had fast become a household name
among the more technologically savvy Internet users, especially among male expatriates living
in China who started chatting on- and offline about him. Once Blogspot was unblocked in China,
though, this changed dramatically. Within a week increasing numbers of Chinese netizens vis-
ited the site and started venting their anger about the posts on the blog in Chinese cyberspace.
At the end of August, 2006, Prof. Zhang Jiehai, a professor of psychology at the Department
of Sociology in the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, called for all Chinese to join him in a
hunt of this immoral foreigner and asked for help in identifying him, so the authorities could
expel him from China (EastSouthWestNorth, 2006; and Shanghaiist, 2006). The open call for
help from Chinese netizens in hunting down a foreigner who was perceived as insulting all Chi-
nese gained a lot of support on the Internet, and resulted in widespread Western media attention
as well. The online hunt slowed down very fast, though, once Chinabounder appeared to have
left China, and stopped blogging on his site. Additionally, expatriates blogging in China, as well
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as Western media organizations, confused the issue through the publication of several conflict-
ing claims about Chinabounder’s identity and purpose in blogging. Despite Western media at-
tention, the involvement of Prof. Zhang, and widespread online hysteria about Chinabounder
and his blog in September 2006, Chinese authorities ignored the entire affair, and neither com-
mented on it, nor took any action.
In the Chinabounder affair, as well as in several other incidents, the absence of the Chinese
state is very noticeable. Although the Chinese government is often portrayed as a very totalitar-
ian government that limits all freedoms of its people, they interfere only rarely with online de-
bates or with online witch-hunts instigated by self-proclaimed vigilante groups who want to pro-
tect China or protect China’s reputation. The Chinese government seems more than willing to
allow Chinese netizens the freedom of online self-regulation.
5. OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO VIGILANTISM
In general, the Chinese state’s reaction to incidents of vigilantism and the attendant increasing
organization of China’s online community has been characterized by restraint. The permissive-
ness the Chinese government has displayed towards online debates, incidents of vigilantism and
the harassment of individuals has been very different from actions taken elsewhere.
While demonstrations of over-taxed or dispossessed farmers have been crushed through the
application of force, while demonstrations against Japan or the USA were overseen by the po-
lice who directed demonstrators towards stones approved for throwing, and while complaints
about the kidnapping and enslaving of their children by parents to the authorities were sup-
pressed or ignored, in cyberspace there is more freedom in China. Netizens are permitted to or-
ganize themselves, to discuss problems they have with the government or government policies,
and to attack and persecute others both online and in real life. There are of course cases where
different levels of the Chinese government or the CCP suppress debates or activities in cyber-
space – more on this below – but there seems to be a greater degree of freedom online, as the
examples above show as well. Although organizations like Amnesty International point to con-
tinuing state suppression of online activities (See International Secretariat, 2004), to cause the
state to react necessitates more than the expression of dissent online. Online dissent has to be
coupled with other activism offline before the authorities intervene, as even the cases their re-
port mentions show.
If a case does not have much impact in the real world, or if it is not accompanied by civil
unrest in the real world, the government appears to be far more tolerant, even if bloggers start
criticizing central institutions like CCTV and its daily 19:00 main news broadcast. An affair that
is still on-going at the time of this article’s writing is the “so yellow, so violent” debate that is
currently running across Chinese cyberspace (EastSouthWestNorth, 2008; Kennedy, 2008).
During a report on the depravity of parts of the Chinese Internet, CCTV showed a brief inter-
view clip of a Beijing elementary school student called Zhang Shufan, who had surfed the Inter-
net when a webpage popped up that she described as “so yellow, so violent” (“yellow” meaning
pornographic in Chinese). Once the phrase and a short video clip had been posted online,
China’s cyberspace exploded with comments from outraged netizens, who at first attacked the
girl for lying on national TV claiming that violent pornographic material was not usually avail-
able on Chinese websites. These attacks soon grew to include CCTV and its reporting standards,
accusing them of having edited the girl’s remarks to represent their own biased view of the
Internet. Currently, many netizens have broadened the attacks to condemn all reporting on
CCTV as biased, propaganda based, or simply as lies. So far, the government has been quiet and
has not interfered with the online debates, showing much restraint despite the widening attacks
on one of the Communist party’s main mouthpieces.
A further interesting feature of the Chinese government’s reactions is not only the measured
and calm way in which the government did react to several of these instances of online vigilan-
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tism. Instead of either ignoring the excitement online or curtailing it, the government also has
repeatedly reacted to online demands and shown a great responsiveness to the complaints. Both
in the case of the Beijing Boy, as well as in the more serious case of childhood slavery, the gov-
ernment monitored the discussions on the Internet and subsequently took action in accordance
with the wishes of the majority of netizens. These actions were taken despite earlier official
steps in the opposite direction, i.e. ignoring and suppressing the complaints of the parents. This
responsiveness of the government and the party to wishes and complaints by ordinary citizens
has boosted the popularity of online discussion forums in China, and has encouraged netizens to
contact government departments directly via the Internet or SMS messages, which has been dis-
cussed by both Hartford (2005) in an article about the electronic mailboxes of the mayors of
Hangzhou and Nanjing, as well as by Latham (2007), who outlines the ways in which emails
and SMS messages interact in informal political discourses in China.
The willingness of netizens in China to interact with officials often overwhelms the gov-
ernment and the resources it allocates to respond to citizens (see again Hartford’s paper). When-
ever government departments decide to use the Internet to interact with ordinary people in
China, they seem to underestimate the numbers of netizens willing to respond, which even holds
true for official online sales events, such as the sale of tickets to the Olympic Games, where the
government drastically underestimated the demand and the willingness of its citizens to acquire
tickets online. In December 2007, when China’s National Bureau of Corruption Prevention an-
nounced the launch of a new website to allow individual citizens to file complaints about offi-
cial corruption, the website collapsed shortly after being made available due to the high volume
of traffic it generated (Shanghai Daily, 2007). While this can be interpreted as a demonstration
of the widespread corruption of government officials, it also shows the willingness of netizens
to engage with government officials and the trust many people in China still have in their gov-
ernment, despite the past fifty years of Chinese history.
Official responses are not uniformly supportive of what they perceive to be online excesses,
though. In a number of incidents the government moved to limit online debates to the extent of
forcing blogs to shut down and asking ISPs to remove certain online forums from their servers.
One such incident that the authorities were fast to suppress in China was a recent pyramid-type
scheme in China’s Northeast in which a company called Yilishen promised investors returns of
over 30 percent per year on their initial investment if they agreed to raise ants for the company,
who stated that they intended to use dried ants to produce several traditional Chinese medicines.
When the scheme collapsed, enraged investors first took to the streets and then to the Internet to
vent their frustrations and their anger. As Yilishen had been well-connected with local authori-
ties throughout the area, the central government decided to suppress all reporting on the affair
both in traditional media as well as online, which caused even more outrage, but meant that the
topic disappeared from Chinese cyberspace while the Chinese government decided how to deal
with the problem (Imagethief, 2007; O’Neill, 2007). As many local and provincial level officials,
as well as a few celebrities were involved in the scandal, the Yilishen ant farming affair ap-
peared too serious to be left to China’s netizens to debate.
6. FRONTIERS OF A TRUCE – OUTLINE OF AN OUTLINE OF CIVIL SOCIETY?
Over the past two years an uneasy truce seems to be emerging between the online community
and the Chinese state. This truce is still broken from time to time, but a general framework of
cooperation seems to be shared between them. This framework consists of certain restraints that
both sides appear to be operating under. The Chinese government presents itself as willing to
allow Chinese netizens to interact freely on the Internet, as long as they regulate and police
themselves and do not cause too much of a disturbance in real life. This unofficial framework,
or the acceptance of the Chinese state to allow netizens this much freedom on state-owned and
controlled Internet servers, allows the sketching of an outline of the limits of an online civil so-
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ciety in China. This civil society in Chinese cyberspace in turn presents itself as fundamentally
pro-Government and anti-chaos, is self-regulating, and often acts as a self-appointed guardian of
China’s reputation and its traditions, rather than being a forum for critical political debates or
pro-democracy movements.
As mentioned before, there are certain topics that Internet users should not debate online –
for example, Taiwan, Tibet, separatism or independence for parts of China, Yilishan, etc. – as
these topics have been judged as too sensitive, and ISPs in China have been asked to block them.
From time to time, terms are added to this list or taken off again, and the list itself is subject to
local variations. Thus, terms like “democracy” or “corruption” were not fully searchable using
Internet connections in northern China during September and October of 2007, around the time
of the 17th National Party Congress during which Hu Jintao’s second term as China’s leader
was confirmed. During the same time access to Western news sites from within China became
more problematic and often only worked via proxy connections, but the restrictions were lifted
again in November.
Through frequently updated blacklists that control the traffic across Internet nodes in China,
the government can also prevent netizens from discussing specific current events they do not
want people to know or talk about, such as mining disasters, industrial accidents, local demon-
strations, etc. In these cases, the names of the involved region, city, or township are added to the
blacklists until a period of calm ensues, at which point they are taken off the list again. While
the blacklists do not prevent netizens from using restricted terms, they slow down or prevent
connection attempts to web pages containing them. This flexible tool of Internet control allows
the state to adapt to changing real-world situations with great speed, but also demonstrates that
online debates that do happen in China exist with the government’s passive approval (See Fal-
lows, 2008, for a more detailed account of China’s Internet censorship).
Another feature of the civil society taking shape in China’s cyberspace is the online com-
munity’s self-image as a responsible and self-regulating community in which different members
of the community will speak out if they consider the behavior of others improper. During the
course of the still on-going debates on the “Too yellow, too violent” statement, several widely
read bloggers started to criticize the online community for their attacks on the primary school
student who made the comment. Their criticism was instrumental in shifting the debate from its
focus on the girl and her family to debates on China’s Central Television and their journalistic
practices.
Similarly, a number of influential bloggers turned online debates during the online discus-
sions of the expatriate woman stopping a car from entering a bike lane in Beijing. Initially, most
of the debates focused on the issue of a foreigner telling a Chinese how to behave in his own
country and were extremely critical of the arrogance and colonial attitude displayed by the expa-
triate woman. This changed after a few days, though, and the online community condemned the
Beijing driver instead, who was ultimately forced to publicly apologize for his uncivilized be-
havior that was now portrayed as having shamed China.
There are no explicit rules of behavior for the online community as yet, and some of the
online debates can get rough in their choice of terms or the threats made against people who are
then identified and whose contact details can get posted online. Limits of behavior seem to be
determined by a number of highly influential and widely read bloggers whose comments can
sway China’s netizens to change their opinions. The exact influence of these bloggers or the
power structure of the online community as a whole has so far not been researched in great de-
tail, although some studies have been published that provide first steps in this direction (See
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Guo, 2007; Yang, 2003).
One area where China’s netizens have firm opinions is their stance on China. China’s online
community sees itself as patriotic and supportive of China and its future development. As a re-
sult, online debates of problem cases often turn to issues of shame and lost face. The students at
the Haidian art school were not merely misbehaving teenagers, but had brought shame on China
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by posting their video online. The Beijing driver confronting a foreign woman on a bike was
also not a mere traffic violator, but had caused China and Chinese everywhere to lose face. The
public apologies that the offenders were forced to make were not to the offended parties, but to
the online community and the people in China in general who had been injured through their
behavior.
These acute feelings of national pride and national shame can be found especially often on
web sites where Chinese netizens interact with Internet users from other countries. Examples of
such pride can be found in many of the posts on the forums run by China Daily, an English lan-
guage newspaper published in China. Any hint of criticism of China by a foreigner attracts sus-
tained vicious attacks by large numbers of Chinese posters, who appear to trawl the entire site
for offending materials (For examples, see Chinadaily BBS, n.d., a-d). The attacks on non-
Chinese are not restricted to sites within China, though, as the group providing the free video
software Videolan found out. On their forums (Videolan, 2006) a user from mainland China
complained in 2006 that one of the Asian download mirrors for the free software was located in
Taipei, Taiwan, and that this gave Taiwan the status of an independent country. The Chinese
poster proceeded to educate the American programmers that Taiwan was only a province of
China and that they should correct the wrong impression their website created. The American
programmers did not quite understand what the problem was supposed to be, and in the end,
they simply stopped reacting to the posts of the Chinese netizen, and the forum thread died.
The patriotism of Chinese netizens indicates that any grassroots movement that fights for
democracy in China is unlikely to develop as long as the Communist party manages to improve
the objective conditions and the subjectively felt and perceived state of the Chinese economy.
China’s netizens approve of the strengthening of China, which means they approve of the Chi-
nese Communist Party as long as it is improving the country both internally as well as on the
international stage. China’s online community wants China strong, but not necessarily democ-
ratic, especially if democracy means slower economic development. The Chinese state can ob-
viously be pleased with this attitude of its citizens, which might explain the willingness of state
officials to allow Internet users the freedom they are currently enjoying.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet in China presents itself as both a very restricted and restrictive space, as well as a
space in which Chinese netizens are free to debate issues that matter to them. Within the limits
set by the Chinese state, Chinese Internet users can address issues with little or no interference
by government officials, and even attack and persecute those who are felt to have failed to meet
unwritten standards of behavior for Chinese people.
The online community is expected to regulate itself, and its members mostly discipline
themselves, or are disciplined by a number of widely read and very influential bloggers. This
self-regulation often prevents the need for the state to interfere in cyberspace, but it has also re-
sulted in state officials paying attention to and following up on issues that are raised online
about specific local problems. The exact nature of the self-regulation of China’s online commu-
nity and the source of the influence of certain bloggers deserve and are currently starting to re-
ceive closer attention among the international academic community.
The relationship between China’s netizens and the state is one of mutual wariness and is
subject to temporal and spatial fluctuations. It is strengthened, though, by the strong feelings of
patriotism expressed by the online community, and by its current support for the general direc-
tion of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule over China. This support is given on the basis of the
continuing improvements the Party is delivering to China, and unlikely to waver while the eco-
nomic development and international political rise of China continues.
INTERNETVIGILANTISM AND STATE CONTROL IN CHINESE CYBERSPACE 37
REFERENCES
Associated Press (2007, June 14). China reports rescue of 217 people forced to work as slaves at brick kilns. Signs on
San Diego. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20070614-1308-china-
slavery.html
Chinabounder (n.d.). Sex and Shanghai. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from http://chinabounder.blogspot.com/
Chinadaily BBS (n.d. a). China: A role model to all nations. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?action=printable&tid=572502
Chinadaily BBS (n.d. b). China got train technology from foreigners. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?action=printable&tid=561656
Chinadaily BBS (n.d. c) How to change Chinese people’s bad manners? Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?gid=2&tid=570320
Chinadaily BBS (n.d. d). Why hate the Japanese? Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?action=printable&tid=102128
China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC) (n.d.). The Internet timeline of China. Retrieved May 14, 2008,
from http://www.cnnic.cn/en/index/0O/06/index.htm
EastSouthWestNorth (2006, August 28). The immoral foreign blogger. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060828_1.htm
EastSouthWestNorth (2008, January 7). Very yellow, very violent. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080107_1.htm
Fallows, J. (2008, March). The connection has been reset. Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall
Fox Knight (2006, June 9). Tongxu Shijian (Crucial Event). Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://shifang1985.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!5B88F2C2064FEE3F!582.entry#comment
French, H. W. (2006, June 3). Online throngs impose a stern morality in China. New York Times. Retrieved May 14,
2008, from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/03/world/asia/03china.html
Goldsmith, J., & Wu, T. (2006). Who controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless world. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Guo, L. (2007). Surveying Internet usage and its impact in seven Chinese cities. Beijing: Center for Social Develop-
ment, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Hartford, K. (2005). Dear Mayor: Online communications with local governments in Hangzhou and Nanjing. China
Information, XIX(2), 217-260.
Imagethief (2007, December 20). Why the Yilishen and farming scandal was the perfect China story. Retrieved May
14, 2008, from http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2007/12/20/why-the-yilishen-sex-tonic-ant-
farming-scandal-is-pure-china-gold.aspx
International Secretariat. (2004). People’s Republic of China – Controls tighten as Internet activism grows. ASA
17/005/2004 (Public). London: Amnesty International.
Kennedy, J. (2008, January 8). So yellow, so violent. Global Voices Online. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from
http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/01/08/china-so-yellow-so-violent/
Latham, K. (2007). SMS, communication, and citizenship in China’s information society. Critical Asian Studies,
39(2), 295-314.
O’Neill, M. (2007, December 3). A Chinese pyramid scheme built on an anthill. Asia Sentinel. Retrieved May 14,
2008, from from http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=910&Itemid=32
Shanghai Daily (2007, December 19). Anti-Corruption website breakdown as masses log on. Retrieved May 14, 2008,
from http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2007/200712/20071219/article_342213.htm
Shanghaiist (2006, August 31). Shanghai + sex + blog + controversy = book deal ? Retrieved May 14, 2008 from
http://shanghaiist.com/2006/08/31/we_gonna_go_to.php
Videolan (2006, August). A serious problem on the page of downloading VLC!!!!!!!! Retrieved May 14, 2008 from
http://forum.videolan.org/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=25748&hilit=Taiwan
Watts, J. (2007, June 16). Enslaved, burned and beaten: Police free 450 from Chinese brick factories. Guardian. Re-
trieved May 14, 2008, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/16/china.jonathanwatts
Yang, G. (2003). The co-evolution of the Internet and civil society in China. Asian Survey, 43(3), 405-422.
